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Abstract 
The research aims to obtain emperical evidence about the effect of corporate governance (independent 
commissioner’s, CEO duality of commissioner’s and audit committee independent) on earnings quality proxied 
by representational faithfulness and moderated by Surplus Free Cash Flow The sample of this research are 
property, real estate and building construction companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2010 to 
2012 periods. The number of companies in this research were 25 companies with 3 years observation. Based on 
purposive sampling method, final sample total is 75 companies. The data analysis methods uses multiple 
regressions and moderate regressions analysis (MRA). The results of these research from multiple regressions 
indicate that independent commissioner’s and CEO duality of commissioner’s has significant effect on earnings 
quality. On the other hand, audit committee independent haven’t significant effect on earnings quality. And The 
results of these research from moderate regressions analysis indicate that all variables off corporate governance 
are moderate by surplus free cash flow hasn’t significant effect on earnings quality. 
Keywords: representational faithfulness, earnings quality, surplus free cash flow, independent commissioner, 
CEO duality board of commissioner, independent audit committee 
 
1. Introduction  
Indonesian capital market has an important role in the economy, ie as an intermediary between parties with 
surplus funds (investors) and parties who need the funds, there is a symbiotic mutualism in it. Capital markets 
are expect to be in an efficient condition, a condition that allows same information to be obtained by every 
investor, which is expected to expected to create conditions of mutual benefit between the two parties 
(Agustiningsih, 2009). 
The shape of the internal corporate accountability to external parties is the company's financial statements, 
which can be used as a support in decision making. Profit is one of the information contained in the financial 
statements which are very important for the internal and external parties. Profit company information can be 
used to assess the performance, predict future earnings and estimate the investment risk or risk credit 
(Kirschenheiter and Melumad 2002). 
Given the importance of the quality of profit, investors and creditors should not only look at the financial 
statements of the company and focusing on its profits alone, regardless of the procedure used to generate 
information about the profit. This condition causes the managers to take actions that make financial reports to be 
good, with the aim of maintaining company’s viability, in order to run stably that would draw the attention of 
investors to invest. 
Managers and managers as well as those within the company that oversees, commissioners independent and 
non-independent, the audit committee plays an important role in overseeing the information reported, especially 
those that related to earnings. If there is lack of supervision, earning management could happen, or deceit in the 
financial statements’ disclosure.  
The increasing attention given by academic researchers on the mechanisms of corporate governance after 
the Asian financial crisis and financial reporting scandals is that good corporate governance will curb unethical 
behavior’s management of earnings management, thus improving the reliability and benefit of the earnings 
quality’s information. It is also believed that the presence of a good governance system can assist in maintaining 
investor’s confidence in the integrity of capital markets (Hashim and Devi, 2007). 
Agency theory of free cash flow has been established based on the premise that the existence of agency 
conflicts in free cash flow between managers and shareholders led to the practice of corporate governance to be 
more vigilant in the effort of reducing conflicts (Jensen, 1986 in Al Dhamari and Ismail, 2012), and argues that 
in situations where a company has high free cash flow but low growth prospects (surplus of free cash flow), 
corporate managers are more likely to invest free cash in negative plans. As the consequence to negative impact 
of this plan, the corporate manager has the opportunity to manipulate the financial statements that will eventually 
deteriorate earnings informativeness (Hill and Iskandar, 2009, Chung et.al, 2005, Rahman and Mohd-Saleh, 
2008). Therefore, the market will expect good governance mechanisms to effectively limit the unethical behavior 
of corporate manager and ascertain the number of company’s high-quality earnings. Although more attention is 
paid to how the corporate governance practices improve earnings quality, only little is known about the role of 
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the agency problem of free cash flow and its relationship with corporate governance and earnings quality.  
Based on the matters described above, researchers are interested in conducting research to find out how big 
the consistency of influence in corporate governance variables (ie; independent boards, CEO duality 
commissioners and independent audit committee) with earnings quality, and to also examine the relationship of 
previous hypothesis with companies who have surplus of free cash flow. In particular, this study investigated the 
interactive effects between corporate governance and the surplus of free cash flow to quality of profit or earnings 
quality.  
 
2. Relationship between variables and formulation of hypotheses  
The relationship between independent variables and the dependent variable in this study can be described as 
follows: 
a. The board of independent directors with quality of profit 
Corporate governance mechanisms are expected to reduce agency conflicts between managers and owners 
that come from the differences in having the company and controlling company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
corporate governance mechanism also restore investor’s confidence in the integrity of the capital markets and 
thus, attract potential investors to the market -Market (Hashim and Devi, 2007). As one of the factors that affect 
the composition of the board affects the effectiveness of the board of directors in the form of improving the 
quality of earnings. 
The presence of independent directors on the board are expected to limit the self-interested behavior of 
management and improve the quality of reported earnings. In another study, Beasley (2006) concluded that the 
proportion of commissioners outside larger on the board reduce the possibility of fraudulent financial statements, 
also in his research, he found that the independent commissioner board is negatively related to acrual 
discretionary. Farida (2012) declared the results of research conducted by Klein (2002), Chtourou et.al (2001), 
Midiastuty and Mahfoedz (2003) that companies which have commissioners who come from outside the 
company may affect earnings management actions. This shows that the proportion of the commissioners who 
come from outside will be able to enhance the oversight role of the board of commissioners. With the 
surveillance, the results produced by the company's financial statements will be more qualified. Based on the 
findings of this study, the hypothesis is as follows:  
H1: independent directors of the Board have a significant effect to earnings quality 
b. CEO duality board of commisioners with earnings quality 
Board leadership structure is another mechanism that affects the commissioners who play a role in 
monitoring and controlling the management of the company. Proponents of the theory of agency found by 
combining the role of chief commissioner with the CEO (CEO duality) will reduce the independence of the 
boards and thus, giving managers the opportunity to seek personal interests instead of the interests of 
shareholders (Chang and Sun, 2010, Firth et al. 2007, Jensen, 1993). 
Gul and Tsui (2001) highlighted the "damage" of earnings quality whom reported by the two roles of the 
chairman and CEO of the combined commissioner. In additionAnderson et.al (2003) found that companies that 
do not apply the CEO duality experience more informative earnings figures. This study examines whether an 
independent chairman will result in increased earnings quality. Therefore, the hypothesis is: 
H2: Independence of the chairman of the commissioner’s boards has significant effect on earnings 
quality. 
c. The independent audit committee with earnings quality 
Anderson et al, (2003) have said that an independent audit committee improves the accuracy of financial 
information and allowing capital markets to place greater reliance on the information released by the company. 
Independent director in charge of the audit committee will have the incentive and a greater tendency to avoid 
activities such as financial misstatements that would undermine their credibility (Sorry et.al 2008). 
Siagian and Tresnaningsih (2011) showed that the quality of reported earnings will increase if the level of 
an independent audit committee also increased. In Suaryana study (2005) has argued that there is a difference 
between the earnings response coefficient between the companies that make up the audit committee and the 
company who does not establish an audit committee. These results indicate that the market assess the earnings 
reported by companies that make up the audit committee have better earnings quality than the earnings reported 
by companies that do not establish an audit committee. The hypothesis is as follows: 
H3: an independent audit committee significant effect on Quality of Earnings 
d. Corporate Governance, Surplus Free Cash Flow with Profit Quality 
Jensen (1986) argued that the increase in free cash flow worsen incentives involved in manager Negative 
Present Value (NPV). The project manager may be of desire itself, perhaps because it gives them control over 
the resources of the company (Chung et al., 2005). Activities that are not optimized by the manager can increase 
agency conflicts by making the destruction of the value of the investment. The investment value destroyed in the 
end lead to a decrease in the share price and may harm a senior executive position, to disguise the negative 
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effects of such investments, the manager can use the tools of opportunistic earnings management to inflate 
reported earnings (Hill and Iskandar, 2009, Chung et al., 2005, Rahman and Mohd-Saleh, 2008). 
Involved in the earnings management, the manager will make revenue figures become more interesting and 
ends can affect the reliability of reported earnings. Rahman and Mohd-Saleh (2008) found that in Malaysia, the 
discounted value of profits in the company on the stock exchange with the agency problem of free cash flow is 
due to misstatement. As a company with high agency conflict, the free cash flow will have a tendency to be 
manipulated and falsely reported in their earnings informativeness, then the stock market will react negatively to 
the information and the earnings quality will be lower for companies with agency problems of high free cash 
flow.  
With the theory of agency costs, is expected to improve the monitoring role of governance mechanisms, for 
the agency conflict free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). As manager of the company with surplus cash are more likely 
to spend money for himself, and not maximizing the company's activities for shareholders, therefore, a strong 
corporate governance system is needed for these companies (Chi and Scott- Lee, 2010, Dittmar and Mahrt- 
Smith, 2007, Harford et.al, 2008, Lee and Lee, 2009). Instead, the corporate governance system has a small role 
in the company with a low free cash flow due to the management of these companies do not wish to invest more 
(Chi and Scott - Lee, 2010). In addition, companies with low free cash flow is usually associated with external 
financing to fund their investment opportunities. 
Apart from the factor of excess cash, growth prospects are also considered as an important factor in the 
agency conflict free cash flow. This is due to the fact that if companies with high growth prospects compared to 
those with low growth prospects, companies with high growth prospects are able to take advantage of all the 
money available to finance their projects with positive results (Jaggi and Gul, 1999). 
In emerging markets, Lee and Lee (2009) in Al Dhamari (2012) have provided evidence that the valuation 
of the company can be improved by forming a strong board structure and the relationship is more prominent in 
the company with excess cash and managers that are rooted. Additionally, Dittmar and Mahrt - Smith (2007) 
found that the old public documents stating earlier that the high ownership, by monitoring companies' use of 
cash "will increase the valuation of the company with excess cash. Because corporate governance is used to 
improve the valuation of companies with high free cash flow, the researchers expect the benefits of governance 
mechanisms to improve the usefulness of reported earnings to be more prominent when the agency conflict 
surplus of free cash flow is more severe. The higher the agency conflict free cash flow in the company, the more 
likely the company will employ strong elements of governance mechanisms to address this problem and to 
ensure a reliable profit reporting. As the result, the market will react positively to the elements and the 
relationship between governance mechanisms and the earnings quality will be stronger. The hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H4: The interaction of independent boards with surplus of free cash flow has significant effect on 
earnings quality. 
H5: The interaction of CEO duality commissioners with surplus of free cash flow has significant 
effect on earnings quality. 
H6: The interaction of the independent audit committee with surplus of free cash flow has significant 
effect on earnings quality. 
e. Control Variables 
This study used firm size variable and proxied by corporate assets that have been natural logarithm applied, 
which follows a previous study conducted by Al Dhamari and Ku Ismail (2012) that using the same control 
variable, the firm size. In this study, there is evidence of a negative relationship between the firm size and the 
quality of earnings. 
 
3. Research Method 
This study aims to analyze the causality that is used to describe the influence of the independent variables, 
namely corporate governance as measured by variables independent board, CEO duality commissioners, and 
independent audit committee, on the dependent variable, namely the earnings quality and free cash flow as 
moderating variable. The population in this study is based on companies that engaged in the field of property, 
real estate, and building construction and listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 2010-2012. 
Sample research method used is purposive sampling. Data analysis method used is descriptive statistical 
methods, the classical assumption, the coefficient of determination and hypothesis testing. Hypothesis testing of 
this study is using multiple regression analysis and regression analysis moderate and treated with SPSS 21. 
 
4. The research and measurement of operating variables.  
a. Earnings quality 
In this study, after testing the representational faithfulness of financial statements, it is assumed that the change 
in earnings is associated with changes in cash flows and that the change in earnings are the high-quality earnings, 
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therefore representational faithfulness is measured by this following calculation (Surifah, 2010): 
KL =  			
		
	
			
			

		100%	 
b. Independency of the board of commissioners. 
The proportion of independent board in this study was measured by dividing the number of independent 
board with the total number of commissioners. 
c. CEO Duality in board of commissioners. 
This variable is measured by a dummy variable that is 1 if only served as the commissioners and 0 if served 
as commissioners and also served as the CEO.  
d. The independent audit committee 
This variable is measured by the proportion independent audit committee’s non commissionaris with all 
members of the audit committee. 
e. Surplus of free cash flow 
FCF for every company is calculated as: 
FCF = Net cash provided by operating activities - Capital expenditures - Dividends 
Surplus of free cash flow is a dummy variable, which is 1 for companies that have free cash flow (FCF), 
and is above the average of the sample and the growth rate (proxied by the price-to-book ratio - PBR) below the 
sample average for each year observations), and 0 for a company that does not have the agency conflict of FCF. 
In other words, a company is said to have agency conflict of free cash flows if the company FCF is high but its 
growth opportunity is low. 
Growth opportunities proxied by the price-to-book ratio (PBR). High PBR indicates that investors perceive 
that the company has high growth opportunities. Thus, the chance of growth is measured by the ratio between 
the price per share and book value per share as used by Chung et.al (2005). PBR shows the difference between 
the market value of equity and book value of equity. This difference reflects the value of the opportunity to 
invest in the future (Gul and Tsui, 1998). The greater this ratio, the greater is the value of growth opportunities. 
PBR = Book Value / Price 
PBR: price per share divided by the book value per share (price-to-book ratio). 
PRICE: stock price per share at the end of the year. 
BV: The book value of equity per share at the end of the year. 
f.    Firms Size 
This study uses variable which is the firm size and proxied by corporate assets that have been natural 
logarithm applied, which follows a previous study conducted by Al Dhamari and Ku Ismail (2012).  
 
5. Data analysis method 
To test the hypotheses above, this study will use two regression models. Model 1 is using multiple regression 
analysis and model 2 is using moderate regression analysis.  
Model 1: 
EARNQUA = a + β1COMIND + β2CEODUAL + β3ACIND + β4SIZE + e 
EARNQUA  = earning quality  
a    = constant 
β1, 2, 3, 4  = coefficient of regression 
COMIND  = independent directors of the board 
CEODUAL = CEO duality in board of commissioners 
ACIND  = independent audit committee 
SIZE   =  firms size 
e    = Error 
Model 2: 
EARNQUA = a + β1COMIND + β2CEODUAL + β3ACIND + β4SIZE + β5SFCF + β6COSFCF + β7DUSFCF 
+ β8ACSFCF + β9SZSFCF + e 
EARNQUA  = earning quality  
a    = constant 
β1, 2, 3, 4  = coefficient of regression 
COMIND  = independent directors of the board 
CEODUAL = CEO duality in board of commissioners 
ACIND   = independent audit committee 
SIZE   =  firms size 
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6. Analysis and discussion 
a. Classical Assumption Test 
i. Normality Test 
Normality test aims to test whether the dependent and independent variables in the regression model are 
normally distributed (Ghozali, 2009). In this study, the normality test is done by using Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
non-parametric test (KS). Basis for the decision on the KS test is by looking at the data significance probability 
residual value. If the probability is above 0.05 then HA is rejected which means the variables are normally 
distributed (Ghozali, 2009) (see table 1). 
ii. Multicoloniarity test 
Multicoloniarity test aims to test whether there is a correlation between the independent variables 
(independent) in the regression model. Multicoloniarity test can be done by analyzing the correlation matrix of 
independent variables, if there is a quite high correlation between the independent variables (generally above 
0.95), then it is an indication of multicoloniarity (Ghozali, 2009). (See attached table 2). 
iii. Heterocedastisity test 
Heterocedastisity test results is obtained by using the Glejser test heterocedastisity which performed for the 
absolute score of the residuals regressed against independent variables. All independent variables have 
significant numbers above 0.05. This indicated that in the regression equation does not occur heterocedastisity 
(see Appendix Table 3). 
iv. Auto correlation test 
Judging from the Durbin-Watson score, it can be seen that the two models are not experiencing auto 
correlation (see attached table 4 and 5). 
b. Hypothesis testing and study 
i. Regression analysis of model 1 
The coefficient of determination of Adjusted R Square is equal to 0,305. This means that 30,5% of earnings 
quality variable can be explained by independent board, CEO duality board of commissioners, independent audit 
committees and firms size variables. While the remainder is equal to (100% -30.5%) 69.5% is explained by other 
factors that are not known and are not included in the regression analysis in this study (see Appendix Table 4). F-
test resulted in significant value of 0.000, and since the significance value is less than 0.05, it can only be 
concluded that the regressed model 1 is usable and feasible to test the data or that the independent boards, CEO 
duality board of commissioners, independent audit committees and firms size variables jointly affect the eanings 
quality (see Appendix Table 6). 
The results of the t test showed that H1 is supported so it means that independent board of company has 
significant influence on the earnings quality at significance level of 10%, with a significance value of 0.089. The 
results of this study support the results of other studies that have been conducted by Boediono (2005), Farida 
(2012) and Taruno (2013). The results on the effectiveness of the board of commissioners as part of the internal 
mechanism for overseeing the financial reporting to generate earnings quality has a significant influence on the 
earnings quality which indicates that effective monitoring is already effective.  
The test result for CEO duality board of commissioners has 0,000 smaller significance than α = 0:05 with 
0.466 as the beta coefficient value. This result means that H2 is supported so it means that CEO duality board of 
commissioners has significant impact on earnings quality, the analysis result of this study is that when company 
does not hav a chairman who acted as both CEO and member of the boards, the level of their earnings quality is 
better than company that has a chairman who also served as member of the boards. 
The test result for independent audit committee variable showed significance value for 0,579, bigger α = 
0:05. The beta coefficient’s result is 0.245. This shows that H3 is not supported so that it can be interpreted as 
the independent audit committee does not have significant relationship to earnings quality. These results support 
the research conducted by Hamdan et al, (2013) and Rachmawati and Triatmoko (2007), The hypothesis 
regarding the relationship between independent audit committee on earnings quality is rejected because of the 
audit committee whose task to provide oversight for the financial reporting process has not been effective 
yet.  The test results for firm size variable showed significance, for 0,154 greater α = 0:05, with -0,026 as the 
beta coefficient. Based on that finding evidence, it means that firm size variable is not significant and has 
negative effect on earnings quality (see attached table 8). 
ii. Regression Analysis of Model 2 
Results Adjusted R Square for model 2 is equal to 0.263, this means that 26.3% of earnings quality 
variables can be explained by the independent variables (see Appendix Table 5). F-test resulted significance 
value of 0.000, and since the significance value is less than 0.05, the conclusion is that the regressed model is 
usable and feasible to test the data or it can be said that the independent variables with surplus of free cash flow 
jointly affect the earnings quality (see Appendix Table 7). 
The result of t-test showed that independent commissioners variable who interact with surplus of free cash 
flow has 0,806 of significance value and greater than α = 0:05. This suggests that the independent board whom 
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interacts with surplus of free cash flow does not have a significant effect. This hypothesis is rejected, the results 
of this study indicate that the surplus of free cash flow variable as the moderating variable can not affect the 
relationship of independent commissioners with earnings quality. In other word, independent directors have not 
been able to improve the earnings quality when agency conflict of surplus free cash flow arised.  
Test result for H5 that CEO duality board of commissioners variable that interacts with surplus of free cash 
flow has 0,550 significance value which means it is greater than α = 0:05 and has beta coefficient for -0,150. 
This suggests that CEO duality board of commissioners variable who interact with a surplus of free cash flow 
does not have any influence significantly influence. This hypothesis is rejected. These result is the same as the 
research conducted by Al Dhamari and Ismail (2012). Chi and Lee (2010) provide evidence which stated that in 
companies with high free cash flow there is a negative relationship between CEO duality and firm value where 
this negative correlation is statistically significant and affect the level of earnings quality. Moreover, KW Lee 
and CF Lee (2009) concluded that when compared to other companies, a significant negative correlation 
between the value of the company and CEO duality is expressed in the company with excess cash or cash flows. 
The test results of independent audit committee variable that interacts with surplus of free cash flow has 0,384 
greater significance value than α = 0,05 while the beta coefficient is at 0,453. 
 This shows that that the independent boards variable that interacts with surplus of free cash flow does not 
have a significant effect. Then, this hypothesis is rejected, Rahman and Ali (2006) and Petra (2007) also provide 
evidences which stated that the independent audit committee does not have a significant relationship with the 
quality of reporting in company’s profits. The agency conflict in surplus of free cash flow is capable to act as the 
moderating variable of independent audit committee to earnings quality. Independent audit committee with large 
proportion of members will be more effective to oversight and to control over the company's cash management 
discretion and that the relationship between independent audit committee and earnings quality will be more 
evident in companies with high SFCF (see Appendix Table 9). 
 
7. Conclusion 
1. Independent directors of the board has significant effect on earnings quality. 
2. CEO duality board of commissioners has significant effect on earnings quality. 
3. The independent audit committee variable has no significant influence on earnings quality 
4. The independent board of commissioners that interacts with the surplus of free cash flow does not 
significantly influence the earnings quality.  
5. CEO duality board of commissioners variable that interacts with surplus of free cash flow does not 
significantly influence the earnings quality. 
6. The independent audit committee variable that interacts with surplus free cash flow does not 
significantly influence the earnings quality. 
 
8. Implications 
Profit is the most important information in the financial statements. Therefore, every company should have 
earning can be classified as the high-quality earnings. For companies, the manager along with his staff must be 
able to control the profits of the company and presenting the earnings based on real situation. Because, even the 
small earnings management activity will affects the earnings, and if  the investor and shareholders detected this, 
it will resulted to a lack of confidence over the company’s financial statemens, adversely affect the company.  
 
9. Suggestions 
1. Future studies may consider using sample of all companies that listed in the Stock Exchange as the 
study population. 
2. Measurement of the earnings quality variable in future studies may use other alternative, example; 
discretionary accruals. 
3. The researcher can then add other independent variables such as managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership, leverage, etcetera to determine the factors that influence the earnings 
quality in company's financial statements. 
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ATTACHMENT 
Table 1 
Normality Test 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Unstandardized Residual 
N 75 
Normal Parametersa,b Mean ,0000000 Std. Deviation ,25576537 
Most Extreme Differences 
Absolute ,107 
Positive ,107 
Negative -,093 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,926 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,358 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
Table 2 
Multicoloniarity Test 
Coefficient Correlationsa 
Model SZSF
CF 
COMI
ND 
ACIN
D 
SIZE CEODUA
L 
DUSFC
F 
ACSFC
F 
COSFC
F 
SFCF 
1 
Correlat
ions 
SZSFC
F 
1,000 ,341 -,295 -,944 -,017 -,006 ,271 -,302 -,946 
COMI
ND 
,341 1,000 ,200 -,362 -,296 ,225 -,179 -,940 -,102 
ACIN
D 
-,295 ,200 1,000 ,313 -,464 ,352 -,894 -,188 ,508 
SIZE -,944 -,362 ,313 1,000 ,018 -,014 -,280 ,340 ,890 
CEOD
UAL 
-,017 -,296 -,464 ,018 1,000 -,759 ,415 ,278 -,104 
DUSF
CF 
-,006 ,225 ,352 -,014 -,759 1,000 -,359 -,230 ,055 
ACSF
CF 
,271 -,179 -,894 -,280 ,415 -,359 1,000 ,174 -,501 
COSF
CF 
-,302 -,940 -,188 ,340 ,278 -,230 ,174 1,000 ,056 
SFCF -,946 -,102 ,508 ,890 -,104 ,055 -,501 ,056 1,000 
Covaria
nces 
SZSFC
F 
,004 ,018 -,019 -,003 ,000 -9,264E-
005 
,020 -,017 -,108 
COMI
ND 
,018 ,687 ,175 -,018 -,047 ,047 -,175 -,687 -,157 
ACIN
D 
-,019 ,175 1,114 ,019 -,093 ,093 -1,114 -,175 ,990 
SIZE -,003 -,018 ,019 ,003 ,000 ,000 -,019 ,018 ,096 
CEOD
UAL 
,000 -,047 -,093 ,000 ,036 -,036 ,093 ,047 -,036 
DUSF
CF 
-
9,264
E-
005 
,047 ,093 ,000 -,036 ,063 -,106 -,051 ,026 
ACSF
CF 
,020 -,175 -1,114 -,019 ,093 -,106 1,393 ,181 -1,092 
COSF
CF 
-,017 -,687 -,175 ,018 ,047 -,051 ,181 ,777 ,092 
SFCF -,108 -,157 ,990 ,096 -,036 ,026 -1,092 ,092 3,413 
a. Dependent Variable: EARNQUA 
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Table 3 
Heterocedastisity Test 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) -1,487 ,949  -1,566 ,122   
COMIND ,590 ,416 ,254 1,418 ,161 ,410 2,441 
CEODUA
L 
,045 ,107 ,101 ,422 ,675 ,230 4,352 
ACIND ,507 ,492 ,355 1,031 ,307 ,111 9,003 
SIZE ,042 ,034 ,428 1,222 ,226 ,107 9,332 
SFCF 1,966 1,016 4,541 1,934 ,057 ,002 419,354 
COSFCF -,334 ,296 -,334 -1,129 ,263 ,150 6,666 
DUSFCF ,055 ,144 ,138 ,386 ,701 ,102 9,796 
ACSFCF -,736 ,521 -,865 -1,414 ,162 ,035 28,487 
SZSFCF -,055 ,037 -3,592 -1,494 ,140 ,002 439,654 
 
Table 4 
Auto correlation test and coefficient determinant for Model 1 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-Watson 
1 ,585a ,343 ,305 ,2629714 1,986 
 
Tabel 5 
Auto correlation test and coefficient determinant for Model 1 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-Watson 
1 ,594a ,353 ,263 ,2707597 2,048 
 
Table 6 
F Test for Model 1 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 2,524 4 ,631 9,123 ,000b 
Residual 4,841 70 ,069   
Total 7,364 74    
 
Table 7 
F Test for Model 2 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 2,599 9 ,289 3,939 ,000b 
Residual 4,765 65 ,073   
Total 7,364 74    
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Table 8 
T Test for model 1 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) ,697 ,575  1,212 ,229 
COMIND -,462 ,268 -,169 -1,726 ,089** 
CEODUAL ,466 ,084 ,546 5,549 ,000* 
ACIND ,245 ,439 ,055 ,557 ,579 
SIZE -,026 ,018 -,141 -1,441 ,154 
 
Table 9 
T Test Model 2 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) ,387 1,731  ,224 ,824 
COMIND -,294 ,829 -,107 -,354 ,724 
CEODUAL ,514 ,190 ,601 2,706 ,009 
ACIND -,037 1,055 -,008 -,035 ,972 
SIZE -,016 ,058 -,084 -,267 ,790 
SFCF ,455 1,847 ,550 ,246 ,806 
COSFCF -,217 ,882 -,133 -,246 ,806 
DUSFCF -,150 ,250 -,197 -,601 ,550 
ACSFCF ,453 1,180 ,209 ,384 ,702 
SZSFCF -,014 ,062 -,466 -,218 ,828 
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